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INTRODUCTION 
On March 1, 2020, the first confirmed case of the novel coronavirus 
(COVID-19) was identified in New York City.1  Within weeks, New York 
City became the epicenter of a major COVID-19 outbreak in the United 
States.2  Hospitals found themselves unprepared for the flood of contagious 
patients who needed care.3  Earlier that March, managers had confiscated 
masks from worried nurses,4 and they suddenly found themselves without 
enough ventilators to go around.5 
At one Manhattan hospital, Mount Sinai West, staff were forced to use 
garbage bags as makeshift protective gear and reuse disposable surgical 
 
 1. Joseph Goldstein & Jesse McKinley, Coronavirus in N.Y.: Manhattan Woman Is First 
Confirmed Case in State, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/nyregion/new-york-coronvirus-confirmed.html 
[https://perma.cc/R6P9-LV75]. 
 2. Consider This From NPR, New York City, U.S. Epicenter, Braces for Peak, NPR 
(Mar. 24, 2020, 5:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/24/820610818/new-york-city-u-s-
epicenter-braces-for-peak [https://perma.cc/B7LH-K8G7]. 
 3. See Jessica Glenza, Ankita Rao & Alexandra Villarreal, ‘It’s What Was Happening in 
Italy’: The Hospital at the Center of New York’s COVID-19 Crisis, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2020, 
1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/mar/27/new-york-coronavirus-
elmhurst-hospital [https://perma.cc/229Y-KUXC]. 
 4. See HEALTH PROS. & ALLIED EMPS., EXPOSED & AT-RISK 6 (2020) [hereinafter 
HPAE], https://www.hpae.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/HPAE-COVID-19-White-
Paper_FINAL_Rev1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z22-E86V]. 
 5. See Glenza et al., supra note 3. 
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masks.6  On March 17, 2020, one of the nurses, Kious Kelly, was diagnosed 
with COVID-19.7  The next day he texted his sister, “I’m okay. Don’t tell 
Mom and Dad. They’ll worry.”8  A few days later, he was dead.9  By mid-
April, at least 26 medical workers in New York City had been killed by the 
COVID-19 virus.10 
Medical staff have faced an unprecedented degree of danger since 
COVID-19 reached the United States.  They were on the frontlines working 
with contagious patients, often with only makeshift protective equipment.11  
While the public has treated healthcare workers as heroes,12 hospital 
management has exploited many by mismanaging existing protective 
equipment, pressuring infected staff to come to work before finishing 
quarantine, and failing to provide crucial information to unions.13 
U.S. labor law affords workers a variety of protections against unsafe 
working conditions.  For example, Section 502 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA) does not consider it a strike when workers refuse to 
perform dangerous tasks.14  The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
allows workers to ensure their safety through protected concerted activity.15  
 
 6. Ebony Bowden, Carl Campanile & Bruce Golding, Worker at NYC Hospital Where 
Nurses Wear Trash Bags as Protection Dies from Coronavirus, N.Y. POST (Mar. 25, 2020, 
4:23 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/03/25/worker-at-nyc-hospital-where-nurses-wear-trash-
bags-as-protection-dies-from-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/582K-9AUG]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Somini Sengupta, A N.Y. Nurse Dies. Angry Co-workers Blame a Lack of Protective 
Gear, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/nyregion/nurse-
dies-coronavirus-mount-sinai.html [https://perma.cc/JF9W-TWSR]. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Julia Marsh, Coronavirus Has Killed at Least 26 NYC Public Hospital System 
Workers, N.Y. POST (Apr. 17, 2020, 10:05 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/04/17/coronavirus-
has-killed-26-employees-of-nyc-public-hospital-system/ [https://perma.cc/ZKM2-N6KQ]. 
 11. Mariel Padilla, ‘It Feels Like a War Zone’: Doctors and Nurses Plead for Masks on 
Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/hospitals-coronavirus-ppe-shortage.html 
[https://perma.cc/7LCB-7CF5]. 
 12. See Zinaria Williams, Heroes Need Help, Too, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 19, 
2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/2020-08-19/health-
care-workers-are-heroes-and-they-need-help [https://perma.cc/EYJ4-KN2A] (citing 
“[n]ightly applause, online discounts, promotional tchotchkes and an ice cream truck in front 
of the hospital scooping complimentary sweets” as examples of public accolades for 
healthcare workers). 
 13. See HPAE, supra note 4, at 14. 
 14. See Labor and Management Relations Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143. The ability to stop 
work without striking affords workers some protections. For example, if courts found that 
they were striking based on an economic dispute, their employer could hire permanent 
replacements. See James A. Gross, Undermining Worker Safety and Health Protection 
Through Statutory Interpretation, 36 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 225, 256 (2019). 
 15. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). 
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Additionally, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
provides regulatory protections to workers placed in dangerous situations.16 
Unfortunately, healthcare workers’ freedom to rely on these protections is 
limited.  When healthcare workers were added to the NLRA in 1974, 
Congress was concerned that strikes or other work stoppages could disrupt 
patient care.17  It added Section 8(g), which stipulates that workers at 
healthcare institutions must give notice before engaging in concerted 
activity18 and limits their ability to negotiate with their employers for more 
effective safety measures.19  Under current case law, it is unclear how this 
would affect their freedom to refuse to perform dangerous work. 
Although medical workers are covered by the NLRA, they face unique 
limitations on their right to engage in concerted activity and to protect their 
work safety.  This Note advocates for labor law reforms to allow workers at 
healthcare facilities to advocate for their own safety.  Part I describes existing 
legal frameworks.  Part II explores different possibilities for reform.  Part III 
recommends changes to Section 7 of the NLRA, which protects concerted 
activity, and Section 8(g), which limits healthcare workers’ rights to engage 
in strikes and protests. 
I. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS FOR WORKER SAFETY 
Currently, few cases have directly addressed the rights of healthcare 
workers to protect their safety.20  There are sources of law that address 
worker safety generally, but these do not touch on the specific needs of 
healthcare workers.  The NLRA discusses the policy interest in keeping 
healthcare workers on the job while giving them the freedom to advocate for 
their rights.21  However, neither the statute nor subsequent case law address 
how this interest would apply during a public health crisis on the scale of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
 16. See About OSHA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha [https://perma.cc/3QMP-GN2W] (last visited Aug. 3, 
2021). 
 17. 120 CONG. REC. 11,147 (1974) (enacted). 
 18. See id. (stating that the notice requirement is “in the public interest to insure the 
continuity of health care to the community and the care and well being of patients”). 
 19. See Kenneth Dolin & Gary Eby, The Duty to Bargain, in THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 879, 884 (John E. 
Higgins, Jr. ed, 6th ed., 2012). 
 20. See id. (listing most recent precedential cases involving healthcare workers’ collective 
bargaining rights, few of which involve safety concerns). 
 21. The NLRA, first passed in 1935, governs relations between employers and labor 
unions and guarantees certain rights to employees when acting collectively. See National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/national_labor_relations_act_nlra [https://perma.cc/C7XT-
B263] (last visited Aug. 23, 2021); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
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As the global pandemic reached the United States, healthcare workers 
were more essential than ever but also more vulnerable.  The scale of the 
outbreak was unprecedented, and medical staff had to learn on the job how 
to treat the COVID-19 virus and control its spread.22  As underprepared 
hospitals were flooded with contagious patients they did not know how to 
cure, the size of the pandemic and COVID-19’s contagiousness created a 
crisis that the 1974 Congress could not have imagined when it added the 
carve out for healthcare workers to the NLRA.23 
The 1974 Congress placed limits on healthcare workers’ right to engage 
in concerted activity with the idea that this right would have been primarily 
used to resolve economic conflicts between workers and managers.24  For 
healthcare workers in such situations, continuity in patient care would be a 
priority.25  During the past year, however, workers at healthcare facilities 
have risked their lives and well-being to treat contagious patients with little 
support from their employers and restricted bargaining rights.26  The existing 
labor law framework cannot adequately address this issue and has fallen 
short of properly protecting workers. 27 
A. Statutory Protections for Those Who Refuse to                        
Perform Dangerous Work 
Federal labor law currently contains two provisions that allow workers to 
refrain from work when they fear for their safety.  The first, Section 502 of 
the LMRA, states that an employee is not striking if she refuses to work 
 
 22. See Christina Jewett & Robert Lewis, As the Terror of COVID Struck, Health Care 
Workers Struggled to Survive. Thousands Lost the Fight, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 23, 
2020), https://khn.org/news/article/as-the-terror-of-covid-struck-health-care-workers-
struggled-to-survive-thousands-lost-the-fight/ [https://perma.cc/Z8AJ-JQAN]. 
 23. See Ceyla Pazarbasioglu & M. Ayhan Kose, Unprecedented Damage by COVID-19 
Requires an Unprecedented Policy Response, BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/07/10/unprecedented-damage-
by-covid-19-requires-an-unprecedented-policy-response/ [https://perma.cc/L78M-57T9] 
(describing the COVID-19 pandemic as a “health crisis of a magnitude with no parallel in 
modern times,” and which requires a unique policy response). 
 24. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(g). 
 25. See Sabrina Kuriakose, Nursing Home Workers at 30+ Facilities Across CT Set to 
Strike Starting May 14, NEWS 8 (May 3, 2021, 9:58 AM), 
https://www.wtnh.com/news/connecticut/nursing-home-workers-at-30-facilities-across-ct-
set-to-strike-starting-may-14/ [https://perma.cc/EN47-YKWA]. 
 26. See Gwynne Hogan, “It’s Spreading Throughout the Hospital”: NYC Healthcare 
Workers Describe Dire Conditions as Coronavirus Patients Flood Wards, GOTHAMIST (Mar. 
25, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/coronavirus-hospitals-nurses-nyc-patients-
flood-wards [https://perma.cc/G6VF-KQDJ]. 
 27. See James Brudney, Forsaken Heroes: COVID-19 and Frontline Essential Workers, 
48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3 (2019) (“[Essential workers] have not received . . . adequate 
workplace health and safety rights or protections.”). 
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because she reasonably fears for her safety.28  The second, Section 7 of the 
NLRA, allows workers to abstain from work if they are enforcing a right in 
their collective bargaining agreement.29 
i. Section 502: Abnormally Dangerous Conditions 
As described above, federal labor law allows workers to advocate for their 
own safety.  The right to refuse hazardous work is most explicitly addressed 
in Section 502 of the LMRA. This provision provides that employees may 
refuse to perform a task if they act “in good faith” and “because of 
abnormally dangerous conditions for work.”30  On its face, Section 502 gives 
employees fairly broad power to protect their own safety. 
The National Labor Relations Board (Board), which oversees the 
enforcement of the NLRA, developed the following test: workers must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that they had a good-
faith belief, (2) that working conditions were abnormally dangerous, (3) that 
they stopped work because of this belief, (4) that this belief is supported by 
ascertainable, objective evidence, and (5) the danger was an immediate threat 
to employee safety.31  Any work stoppage which meets these conditions is 
not a strike for the purposes of the NLRA.  This applies even to unionized 
workers with a no-strike provision in their collective bargaining agreement.32 
The right underlying Section 502 is incredibly important to workers who 
may otherwise have to choose between keeping their jobs or risking their 
lives.  In practice, however, its protections are limited.  The provision does 
offer a loophole to avoid no-strike clauses, which is important because 
strikes are strictly controlled under American labor law.33  However, Section 
502 does not provide any affirmative rights.34  Workers who rely on Section 
502 may not face the consequences they would for striking, but the statute’s 
language does not guarantee them reinstatement or backpay.35  It merely says 
that “the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because 
 
 28. The LMRA, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, was an amendment to the NLRA 
passed in 1947. See Labor, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/labor [https://perma.cc/J6US-5XLJ] (last visited Aug. 3, 
2021). 
 29. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984). 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 143; see TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 402 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that workers exposed to uranium without safety training or sufficient equipment faced 
“abnormally dangerous” conditions). 
 31. See TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 603 (1999). 
 32. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 386 (1974). 
 33. See Gross, supra note 14, at 252. It is unclear if Section 502 would apply to unionized 
workers with a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 283. 
 34. See 29 U.S.C. § 143. 
 35. See id. 
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of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of 
such employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike.”36  The provision 
does not truly empower workers to refuse unsafe work but only mitigates the 
potential consequences of doing so. 
Even if the Board does grant workers reinstatement or back pay, in 
practice they may not receive it.  This occurred most notoriously in TNS, Inc. 
v. NLRB.37  In 1981, unionized employees at a manufacturing plant worked 
closely with depleted uranium.38  The plant did not have adequate safety 
precautions and fell below standards set by the Tennessee Division of 
Radiological Health.39  As the union tried to negotiate a new collective 
bargaining agreement with better safety provisions, they organized a 
walkout.40  Management responded by hiring replacement workers.41 
Litigation over the case dragged on for over 16 years.42  The Board 
ultimately held in favor of the employees and created the definitive test to 
determine whether a work stoppage is protected by Section 502.43  After the 
final Board ruling, the case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit.  The appellate 
court upheld the Board’s legal conclusions, but determined that the case had 
stretched on too long and that it was no longer practical to give the employees 
in TNS reinstatement or backpay.44  Since TNS, there has been almost no 
litigation concerning Section 502.45  While the case may not be the cause, 
the lack of subsequent litigation suggests that unions likely do not find the 
provision helpful. 
Workers relying on Section 502 may have other concerns.  Safety disputes 
may be subject to grievance mechanisms provided for in collective 
bargaining agreements.  If these disputes go to arbitration, the Board will 
likely defer to the results, even if it undermines safety concerns.46  There is 
also a relatively high standard for determining whether a work stoppage 
meets the criteria — refusals to work must be based on objective evidence 
that working conditions are abnormally dangerous.47 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. 296 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 38. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 603 (1999). 
 39. Id. at 604. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 605. 
 42. See TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2002); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers 
Int’l Union v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 269 (D.C.C. 1986). 
 43. TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 603. 
 44. TNS, Inc, 296 F.3d at 404. 
 45. See Sara Slynn, Protected Concerted Activity and Non-unionized Employee Strikes: 
Worker Rights in Canada in the Time of COVID-19, 57 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 605, 619 (2020). 
 46. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 337 N.L.R.B. 568, 569 (2002). 
 47. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 386–87 (1974). 
1370 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
The scope of activities it covers is also unclear.  While Section 502 applies 
to both unionized and non-unionized workers, it is not clear if it applies to 
concerted activity beyond strikes.48  While Sections 7 and 8(g), discussed 
below, apply to a variety of activities, Section 502 is limited to work 
stoppages.49  Its primary application appears to be helping unions work 
around “no strike” provisions in their collective bargaining agreements.50 
ii. Section 7: Protected Concerted Activity 
Section 7 of the NLRA has also been used to protect worker safety, 
although it does not approach the topic as directly as Section 502.  This 
section of the Act protects collective employee actions, such as unionizing, 
from employer retaliation.  It allows workers “to engage in . . . concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.”51  As suggested by the statutory language, this generally applies 
to concerted group activity rather than individual action. 
This section of the NLRA protects a variety of concerted activities, from 
encouraging union members to lobby politicians52 to posting obscenities 
about employers on Facebook.53  Workers have also used it to protest unsafe 
working conditions.  Perhaps the most famous case to address Section 7 
rights in relation to safety is NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., where a 
group of machinists was forced to work in an unheated shop in the middle of 
winter and, unable to bear the cold, seven walked out of work.54  The 
Supreme Court held that the workers in Washington Aluminum had the right 
to protect their health and they were entitled to reinstatement and backpay.55 
Subsequent case law has expanded on this provision’s relationship to 
workplace safety.  In NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., an employee 
refused to drive a truck he considered too dangerous to be on the road.56  The 
Court ultimately held that this refusal to work was protected concerted 
 
 48. See Anton Hajjar, Issues Under the National Labor Relations Act During the Covid-
19 Pandemic: Employee Rights to Refuse to Work in Unsafe Conditions, and Issues for 
Bargaining and Those Affecting Health Care Institutions, INT’L LAWS. ASSISTING WORKERS 
NETWORK 2 (Sept. 13, 2020). 
 49. See id. at 15. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 157; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (explaining it is an unfair labor 
practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title”). 
 52. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569 (1978). 
 53. See NLRB v. Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 54. 370 U.S. 9, 10–11 (1962). 
 55. See id. at 17–18. 
 56. 465 U.S. 822, 824 (1984). 
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activity.57  Although the employee made an individual decision, he acted to 
enforce a provision of his union’s collective bargaining agreement, a contract 
negotiated between the union and employer to enforce the employees’ 
rights.58  By invoking the agreement, the Court held that the driver had acted 
collectively.59  Since this case, an employee may be protected from 
retaliation if (1) she acts based on a reasonable belief that she is asked to 
perform a task she is not required to perform under her collective bargaining 
agreement and (2) her action is reasonably directed toward the enforcement 
of a right in the collective bargaining agreement.60 
 Section 7 has some advantages over Section 502 as a mechanism to 
protect workplace safety.  The criteria laid out in City Disposal rely on 
workers’ subjective fear for their safety, rather than Section 502’s more 
onerous objective standard.61  This is potentially useful in situations in which 
a worker must act quickly, without the time or means to determine whether 
their fear is objectively provable.  In many hazardous situations, a worker 
likely lacks the chance to mull over the potential merits of their case before 
acting and are likely unaware of these specific labor provisions. 
However, Section 7 has limits as a means of protecting workers.  As 
described above, Section 7 is not a catch-all for any protest or work stoppage; 
it must be concerted and for “mutual aid.”62  It only protects an individual 
worker’s actions when she acts to enforce her collective bargaining 
agreement.63  Workers who do not have a safety provision in their agreement 
may not act collectively for the purposes of the statute.64  Non-unionized 
workers, who do not have collective bargaining agreements, have an even 
smaller universe of actions protected by Section 7.65 
Finally, Section 7 generally does not protect workers from retaliation if 
their actions undermine their union.  In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western 
 
 57. See id. at 841. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 832 (“[W]hen an employee invokes a right grounded in the collective-
bargaining agreement, he does not stand alone. Instead, he brings to bear on his employer the 
power and resolve of all his fellow employees. When, for instance, James Brown refused to 
drive a truck he believed to be unsafe, he was in effect reminding his employer that he and 
his fellow employees, at the time their collective-bargaining agreement was signed, had 
extracted a promise from City Disposal that they would not be asked to drive unsafe trucks.”). 
 60. See id. at 840. 
 61. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 143. According to the Board, “[i]nquiry into the objective 
reasonableness of employees’ concerted activity is neither necessary nor proper in 
determining whether that activity is protected.” Tamara Foods, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1307, 1308 
(1981), aff’d sub nom., Tamara Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 692 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 62. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 63. See Gross, supra note 14, at 264–65. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
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Addition Community Organization, the Supreme Court held that a picket was 
not protected concerted activity, as it was organized by a minority of union 
members.66  Similarly, the statute does not protect “wildcat strikes,” or 
strikes organized without union approval.67  Although individual employees 
may engage in protected concerted activity, the right is fundamentally 
intended for collective, group actions.  The statute specifically refers to 
“concerted activity”; as the Court in City Disposal noted, the individual truck 
driver could only assert a right in his collective bargaining agreement due to 
“prior negotiating activities of his fellow employees.”68  It is a right that an 
individual may assert on behalf of the group.69 
B. Regulatory Protections for Those Who Refuse to Perform 
Dangerous Work 
While NLRA creates a framework for workers to protect their own rights, 
the federal government may also act directly against employers.  OSHA, 
created through the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), is 
responsible for monitoring workplace safety.70  This agency is responsible 
for passing regulations to ensure workplace safety, inspecting workplaces to 
ensure compliance, and responding to worker complaints.71  It is, in other 
words, meant to prevent the existence of hazardous working conditions. 
In addition to actively monitoring workplace safety, OSHA regulations 
have given workers another means of refusing unsafe work.  Under 
Regulation 1977.12(b)(2), an employee faced with a choice “between not 
performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury or death” 
may be protected from retaliation.72  This protection only applies if (1) the 
employee’s apprehension of death or injury is reasonable, (2) there is 
insufficient time to eliminate the danger “through resort to regular statutory 
enforcement channel,” and (3) the employee unsuccessfully sought “a 
correction of the dangerous condition” from his employer.73 
This regulation has survived a challenge before the Supreme Court.  In 
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, the Court held that Regulation 1977.12(b)(2) 
 
 66. 420 U.S. 50, 52 (1975). 
 67. A wildcat strike is “[a] strike not authorized by a union or by a collective-bargaining 
agreement.” Wildcat Strike, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 68. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 832 (1984). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Occupational Safety and Health Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). 
 71. See OSHA Worker Rights and Protections, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/workers [https://perma.cc/3883-JBFN] (last visited Aug. 3, 
2021). 
 72. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (2021). 
 73. Id. 
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complies with the OSH Act.74  There, management fired two maintenance 
workers who refused to do repairs over 20 feet above the ground with only a 
flimsy safety net for protection.75  Earlier, other employees had been injured 
performing the same task and, tragically, one had fallen through the safety 
net and died.76  The workers argued that the OSHA regulation allowed them 
to refuse the task without being fired.  The Court held that the OSHA 
regulation was a valid interpretation of the OSH Act. 
However, the Court stated that OSHA did not have the authority to create 
a “strike with pay” provision.77  The worker was reinstated, but he was not 
entitled to back pay for the period when he refused to work.78  Further, as the 
Court noted, the regulation does not entitle employees to pressure their 
employers to correct the dangerous conditions.79  Whirlpool made it clear 
that the regulation is not meant as a means of leveraging employers, but as a 
last resort when workers face death or serious injury. 
In addition to the lack of backpay, there are other reasons why this 
regulation may not adequately protect workers’ safety.  Its use of an 
objective reasonable person standard sets a higher evidentiary standard than 
either Section 502 or Section 7,80 and OSHA strongly encourages workers to 
first try to resolve safety issues internally.81  The agency does not have the 
budget or manpower to fully enforce its regulations even outside the context 
of a pandemic.82  It also faced a massive backlog during the east coast’s first 
wave of COVID-19.83  This regulation is a risky last resort for employees, 
enforced by an often overwhelmed agency. 
 
 74. 445 U.S. 1, 22 (1980). 
 75. See id. at 4. 
 76. See id. at 5. 
 77. Id. at 17. 
 78. Id. at 22. 
 79. Id. at 21. 
 80. The OSHA regulation uses an objection reasonable person standard to determine 
danger. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (2021); see also John B. Flood, Revisiting the Right to 
Refuse Hazardous Work Amidst the Anthrax Crisis of 2001, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 545, 
568 (2003). Section 502 allows workers to refuse work if they have a good-faith belief 
supported by objective evidence. See TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 605 (1999). Section 7, by 
contrast, does not require workers to act based on objective evidence. See Tamara Foods, Inc., 
258 N.L.R.B. 1307, 1308 (1981). 
 81. See Workers’ Right to Refuse Dangerous Work, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/workers/right-to-refuse [https://perma.cc/7E7W-K958] (last 
visited Aug. 3, 2021). 
 82. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Is OSHA Falling Down on the Job?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
2, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/business/is-osha-falling-down-on-the-
job.html [https://perma.cc/65SB-V4TZ]. 
 83. See David Sparkman, Backlog Hinders OSHA’s Handling of COVID-19 Complaints, 
EHS TODAY (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.ehstoday.com/covid19/article/21143644/backlog-
hinders-oshas-handling-of-covid19-complaints [https://perma.cc/8JMZ-7T9L]. 
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C. Healthcare Workers’ Rights Under Existing Labor Law 
For the past several decades, workers at healthcare institutions have been 
covered by the NLRA and the legal frameworks described above.  However, 
there are limitations exclusive to workers in the healthcare field.  When they 
were added to the NLRA in 1974, there were concerns that any work 
stoppages could endanger patients.84  Congress addressed these concerns 
through Section 815(g), which requires that unionized workers at any 
healthcare institution give ten days’ notice before “engaging in any 
strike . . . or other concerted refusal to work.”85  Employees who violate 
these notice requirements are subject to sanctions under Section 8(d) and lose 
their status as employees for the purposes of the NLRA.86  This sanction 
would be no mere slap on the wrist but would strip workers of substantial 
legal protections. 
Section 8(g) applies to any worker employed at a healthcare institution.87  
The Board defines this rather broadly as “[h]ospitals, medical and dental 
offices, social services organizations, child care centers and residential care 
centers with a gross annual volume of at least $250,000 . . . for nursing 
homes and visiting nurses associations, the minimum is $100,000.”88  Any 
employee directly employed by such a facility is therefore subject to Section 
8(g) notice requirements. 
However, while the provision applies to all workers employed by a 
healthcare facility, it does not apply to subcontractors or other workers who 
work on the premises but are not directly employed by facility.89  Only 
healthcare employees of healthcare employers need to comply with Section 
 
 84. 120 CONG. REC. 11,147 (1974) (stating that Congress added notice provisions because 
“[i]t is in the public interest to insure the continuity of health care to the community and the 
care and well being of patients”); see also 1199 Nat’l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Emps., 
232 N.L.R.B. 443, 446 (1977). 
 85. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g). The Senate Report accompanying the 1974 Health Care 
Amendments did suggest that there should be a carve out. It stated that “a labor organization 
will not be required to serve a ten day notice or to wait until the expiration of the ten day 
notice when the employer has committed unfair labor practices as in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. 
NLRB.” S. REP. No. 93-766, at 4 (1974). In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, an employer 
unlawfully tried to replace an existing union with one more sympathetic to management. 350 
U.S. 270, 272–73 (1956). 
 86. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 87. See id. § 158(g). 
 88. Jurisdictional Standards, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-
protect/the-law/jurisdictional-standards [https://perma.cc/KTQ9-BV3T] (last visited Aug. 10, 
2021). 
 89. See NLRB v. IBEW Local Union No. 388, 548 F.2d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding 
that electrical workers employed by a contractor could strike and protest on hospital grounds 
without giving ten days’ notice); see also Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., Local 1253, 248 
N.L.R.B. 244, 247 (1980) (holding that non-health care employees of non-health care 
employers are not subject to Section 8(g), even if they work at a hospital). 
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8(g) notice requirements.90  Subcontractors, or employees of another 
business that share the building, do not need to give notice for protests or 
work stoppages that happen to take place on the premises of, for example, a 
nursing home; they would only give notice for activity directed at the nursing 
home.91  Provided their work stoppage does not interfere with patient care, 
sub-contractors would likely be exempt from notice requirements. 
The Board and federal courts of appeals have generally applied Section 
8(g) to unionized workers.92  Unrepresented employees are often not 
required to give notice, even when they act collectively.93  In NLRB v. Long 
Beach Youth Center, Inc., for example, youth center staff were not a union 
for the purposes of Section 8(g), although they organized a work stoppage as 
a protest and were actively trying to unionize.94  In Kapiolani Hospital v. 
NLRB, an unrepresented hospital ward clerk participated in a nurses’ strike.95  
Although she had not given notice before joining the strike and she refused 
to cross the picket line, the court held that she had not violated Section 8(g).96 
It is not clear from the plain language of the statute which activity is 
subject to Section 8(g).  The provision rather vaguely refers to “any 
strike . . . or other concerted refusal to work at any health care institution.”97  
The Board has held that it may apply to “all forms of picketing and not just 
to that which involves a work stoppage.”98  It has required notice even when 
 
 90. See IBEW Local Union No. 388, 548 F.2d at 711; Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 
Local 1253, 248 N.L.R.B. at 246. 
 91. See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., Local 1253, 248 N.L.R.B. at 246. 
 92. See, e.g., Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1980); 
see also NLRB v. Long Beach Youth Ctr., Inc., 591 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1979). 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 8.3% of healthcare support workers are 
unionized, as are 13.7% of healthcare practitioners in the private sector. Union Affiliation of 
Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. 
(Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm [https://perma.cc/2RBG-
DGMJ]. Around 17% of nurses are unionized, and interest in union membership has increased 
dramatically among healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Ian Prasad 
Philbrick & Reed Abelson, Health Care Unions Find a Voice in the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/28/health/covid-health-workers-
unions.html [https://perma.cc/D5D7-VXDG]; see also Aneri Pattani, Health Workers Unions 
See Surge in Interest Amid Covid, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 12, 2021), 
https://khn.org/news/article/health-workers-unions-see-surge-in-interest-amid-covid/ 
[https://perma.cc/58BG-GH8N] (noting 70% of nurses voted to unionize). 
 93. See Kapiolani Hosp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 230, 233 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that “Section 
[8(g)] does not speak of unrepresented individuals nor small groups of unrepresented 
individuals”). 
 94. 591 F.2d at 1278. 
 95. 581 F.2d at 233. 
 96. See id. at 234. 
 97. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g). 
 98. Dist. 1199, Nat’l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Emps., 256 N.L.R.B. 74, 76 (1981). 
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nurses collectively refuse to work voluntary overtime.99  In New York State 
Nurses Ass’n, hospital management frequently relied on nurses to volunteer 
for extra shifts, which cut into their meal breaks.100  Frustrated, the unionized 
nurses all began refusing overtime on the same day.101  The NLRB held that 
they should have given notice, as the hospital struggled to schedule surgeries 
during their protest.102  The Ninth Circuit came to a similar decision in SEIU, 
United Healthcare Workers-West v. NLRB.103 
Short work stoppages or protests may also be subject to Section 8(g) 
notice requirements, even if these activities do not harm patients.104  In 
National Union of Hospital & Health Care Employees, for example, 
employees protested outside of a hospital while off duty and without 
blocking the entrance.105  Relying on a strict reading of the statute, the Board 
held that the employees still should have provided ten days’ notice before 
organizing the protest.106  It reasoned that the public interest in healthcare 
outweighed the right to protest, even if the protest did not immediately 
threaten patient care.107 
Section 8(g) may apply differently to different types of strikes.  For 
example, courts have held that it may not apply to people who strike to 
support other workers, known as a sympathy strike.108  The Second Circuit 
allowed two doctors to engage in a sympathy strike without giving notice.109  
However, the Board has been less lenient with unions that encourage 
members to engage in sympathy strikes.110  Similarly, “wildcat strikes,” 
which are strikes not sanctioned by a union, may be protected and was in 
East Chicago Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. NLRB, which allowed employees 
to walk out of work without notifying their union or submitting ten days’ 
 
 99. See N.Y. State Nurses Ass’n, 334 N.L.R.B. 798, 798 (2001); see also SEIU, United 
Healthcare Workers-W. v. NLRB, 574 F.3d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 100. 334 N.L.R.B. at 798–99 (2001). 
 101. See id. at 799. 
 102. See id. at 801. 
 103. 574 F.3d at 1214 (holding that unionized workers at a hospital should have given more 
than four days’ notice before declining to work overtime). 
 104. See Dist. 1199, Nat’l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Emps., 232 N.L.R.B. 443, 443 
(1977); see also N.Y. State Nurses Ass’n, 334 N.L.R.B. at 801. 
 105. Dist. 1199, Nat’l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Emps., 232 N.L.R.B. at 443.  
 106. See Dist. 1199, Nat’l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Emps., 232 N.L.R.B. at 445. 
 107. See id. 
 108. A sympathy strike is organized by “union members who have no grievance against 
their own employer but who want to show support for another union involved in a labor 
dispute.” Sympathy Strike, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 109. See Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 510, 519 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 110. See Hosp. & Institutional Workers’ Union, Local 250, 255 N.L.R.B. 502, 507 (1981) 
(holding that a union which subtly encouraged its members to engage in a sympathy strike 
was required to give notice under Section 8(g)). 
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notice.111  A small, disorganized work stoppage would have been less 
disruptive to patient care than a strike organized by the union. 
When deciding whether home health aides should have given notice 
before a work stoppage, the Second Circuit has argued that analyzing the risk 
of harm to patients is more important than actual harm.112  However, when 
determining whether a wildcat strike falls under 8(g), the Seventh Circuit 
asked whether a strike caused inconvenience or actual danger.113  There is 
not a consensus among appellate courts on which line of reasoning should 
be adopted.  However, there is a larger internal issue as there is a gap in 
Section 8(g)’s application to safety.  Most existing case law exploring the 
contours of Section 8(g) focuses on compensation or overtime.114  It has not 
been litigated in situations in which healthcare workers feared for their 
safety, and it is unclear if notice requirements would apply if a unionized 
healthcare worker refused to perform work in unsafe conditions. 
There has been extensive litigation on safety-related work stoppages in 
other fields.  However, this line of cases has run parallel to those concerning 
workers in health care, without intersecting.  Now that healthcare workers 
are on the front lines of a major public health crisis, this gap in the law has 
taken on new significance.115  Since the outbreak of COVID-19, large 
numbers of hospital employees have not been able to trust that their 
workplaces are safe.116  As they try to advocate for better personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and contact tracing,117 it is not clear to what extent they 
can rely on strikes to do so. 
D. Healthcare Workers’ Safety During the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Existing legal frameworks were not designed for a public health crisis on 
the scale of the recent pandemic or for a disease as contagious as COVID-
19.  Many healthcare workers found themselves providing direct care to 
contagious patients without adequate safety training or PPE.118  Despite 
some statutory and regulatory protections, workers had little recourse if they 
 
 111. 710 F.2d 397, 403–04 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 112. NLRB v. Special Touch Home Care Servs., 708 F.3d 447, 460 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 113. E. Chi. Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc., 710 F.2d at 404. 
 114. See Hajjar, supra note 48, at 18–22 (citing and describing a collection of cases 
concerning Section 8(g)). 
 115. See id. at 17 (“Issues of refusals to work in dangerous conditions may arise in the 
health care setting.”) 
 116. See HPAE, supra note 4, at 8. 
 117. Hajjar, supra note 48, at 6. 
 118. See HPAE, supra note 4, at 7. 
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felt their safety was at risk.119  Hospitals struggled with both the danger the 
disease posed to staff and with the overwhelming number of patients.120 
i. Hospital Conditions During COVID-19 
In early 2020, the U.S. medical community found itself unprepared for the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  This was due in part because of the sheer scale of the 
pandemic.121  During the first wave of COVID-19 in the United States, 
hospitals around the country were overwhelmed and understaffed.122  Many 
hospitals in areas affected by the virus did not have enough staff, beds, or 
equipment to treat the influx of patients.123  When the pandemic first peaked 
in New York City, hospitals operated at nearly triple their normal capacity.124 
Many hospitals cited maintaining qualified workers as one of their most 
significant challenges.125  While best practice at an emergency room is to 
provide one nurse for every four patients, some New York City nurses found 
themselves treating as many as 23 patients.126  As a result, healthcare 
workers were stretched dangerously thin.  According to Anne, a tristate area 
x-ray technician who worked closely with COVID-19 patients, her 
department did not have sufficient staff to handle the pandemic in New York 
City.127  Even working significant overtime, she and her colleagues struggled 
to provide adequate care.128 
In addition to staffing, hospitals struggled simply to house patients.  In 
March and April of 2020, New York area hospitals opened unused wings and 
converted their pediatric wards in order to accommodate COVID-19 
 
 119. See id. at 15. 
 120. See Reed Abelson, Covid Overload: U.S. Hospitals Are Running Out of Beds for 
Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/health/covid-
hospitals-overload.html [https://perma.cc/GF7D-U4WV]. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Brian M. Rosenthal et al., Why Surviving the Virus Might Come Down to Which 
Hospital Admits You, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/nyregion/Coronavirus-hospitals.html 
[https://perma.cc/GV5L-WNB5]. 
 125. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OEI-06-20-00300, HOSPITAL 
EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PULSE 
SURVEY MARCH 23–27, 2020 (2020) [hereinafter DHHS SURVEY], 
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4BG-MZR9]. 
 126. Rosenthal et al., supra note 124. 
 127. See Telephone Interview with Anne Smith (Oct. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Smith] (on file 
with author). To keep the source’s name confidential, a pseudonym is used. 
 128. See id. 
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patients.129  Hospitals also faced massive equipment shortages.  Since 
COVID-19 entered the United States, hospitals struggled to obtain essentials 
such as beds, gloves, test kits, and ICU medications.130 
The COVID-19 pandemic was unique not only in its scale, but also in the 
threat it posed to medical staff.  Nurses and other healthcare workers risk 
contracting the disease when they treat patients who test positive for 
COVID-19.  They are then at risk of death or illness, and may spread the 
virus to their colleagues or other patients.131  Anne, the X-ray technician, 
described going from patient to patient, and physically maneuvering each 
into her equipment, and then moving onto the next.  “We became vectors for 
the disease,” she claimed.132 
As the virus spread across the country, hospitals struggled to adequately 
protect their staff from the virus.  This was not due entirely to 
mismanagement; after all, facilities could not conjure equipment from thin 
air.  However, many hospitals failed to take actions that could have 
minimized the risk.  Several refused to disclose whether their employees had 
tested positive for the virus, even when unions specifically requested this 
information.133  Some managers also pressured potentially contagious 
 
 129. See Miguel Marquez & Sonia Moghe, Inside a Brooklyn Hospital That is 
Overwhelmed with COVID-19 Patients and Deaths, CNN (Mar. 31, 2020, 2:46 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/30/us/brooklyn-hospital-coronavirus-patients-
deaths/index.html [https://perma.cc/C2RF-D7KK]. 
 130. See Demoralized Health Workers Struggle as Coronavirus Numbers Surge, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2020, 3:56 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-12-
11/demoralized-health-workers-struggle-as-virus-numbers-surge [https://perma.cc/HH7W-
SHQG]; Daniel Joseph Finkenstadt, Robert Handfield & Peter Guinto, Why the U.S. Still Has 
a Severe Shortage of Medical Supplies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://hbr.org/2020/09/why-the-u-s-still-has-a-severe-shortage-of-medical-supplies 
[https://perma.cc/36PP-HAXF]. The U.S. Navy tried to ease the burden on New York City 
hospitals by sending in the USNS Comfort, a fully equipped hospital ship, to treat non-
COVID-19 patients. However, it ultimately departed from New York City after treating only 
182 patients. See Gidget Fuentes, Beyond Mercy: Navy’s COVID-19 Hospital Ship Missions 
and the Future of Medicine at Sea, USNI NEWS (May 26, 2020, 9:54 AM), 
https://news.usni.org/2020/05/25/beyond-mercy-navys-covid-19-hospital-ship-missions-
and-the-future-of-medicine-at-sea [https://perma.cc/3ELE-ZVSD]. 
 131. See HPAE, supra note 4, at 14, 22. 
 132. Smith, supra note 127. 
 133. Many healthcare facilities failed to satisfy their regulatory obligations under OSHA 
to log incidents in which employees contracted COVID-19, where the incidents occurred, and 
how many days COVID-positive employees were absent from work. They also failed to share 
this information with unions. See generally Employer Safety Violation List, HEALTH PROS. & 
ALLIED EMPS. [hereinafter HPAE Violation List], https://www.hpae.org/2020/10/hpae-osha-
peosha-complaint-list/ [https://perma.cc/CM5V-P3UD] (last visited Aug. 13, 2021). It is 
firmly established in case law that employers have a duty to disclose information to unions. 
See, e.g., NLRB v. ACME Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1967) (holding that employers 
have a general obligation to provide unions with information they need to carry out their 
duties); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1956) (holding that employers have 
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employees to return to work before completing two full weeks of 
quarantine.134 
One of the largest issues healthcare workers faced was caused by a 
combination of the virus’s scale and contagiousness.  While hospitals 
struggled to find adequate staff to treat the influx of patients, they also had 
to protect existing staff from catching the disease.  This could best be 
accomplished through the use of PPE, which was in short supply.135  Few 
healthcare facilities had adequate N95 respirators and were forced to use any 
alternative available or to find ways to decontaminate masks.136  Many 
hospitals and nursing homes simply did not have the necessary equipment to 
protect their staff. 
Hospitals and other medical facilities faced serious challenges in trying to 
provide staff with equipment and caring for contagious patients.  However, 
according to accounts from unions and workers, employers often failed to do 
the bare minimum to protect their employees’ safety. In the early days of the 
virus, some healthcare institutions forbade workers from wearing masks and 
even confiscated respirators which workers had brought from home.137 As 
the pandemic progressed, even nurses who provided direct care to COVID-
19 patients had to use makeshift PPE or reuse N-95 respirators, which may 
or may not have fit properly.138 
Some healthcare facilities resorted to using carcinogenic chemicals to 
clean N-95 respirators for reuse.139  When hospitals did receive PPE, some 
gave it to the highest-ranking staff, rather than those who spent the most time 
treating COVID-19 patients.140  Hospitals also pressured workers exposed to 
the virus to return to work early, disregarding quarantine guidelines.141  
Many employers also failed to maintain or provide records of which 
 
a responsibility to disclose some financial information as part of their duty to bargain in good 
faith). 
 134. See HPAE, supra note 4, at 14. 
 135. See id. at 9. 
 136. See Chris Hamby, They Evoke Darth Vader, but These Masks May Save Your Doctor’s 
Life, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/us/coronavirus-
masks-elastomeric-respirators.html?searchResultPosition=12 [https://perma.cc/D5KR-
N5GX]. 
 137. See HPAE, supra note 4, at 11. 
 138. See id. at 13. 
 139. See Kerri Jansen, During the Coronavirus Pandemic, Hospitals Have Taken 




 140. See HPAE, supra note 4, at 12. 
 141. See id. at 7. 
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employees had tested positive for COVID-19,142 which made it difficult for 
OSHA or unions to track the spread within workplaces.  These employers 
often withheld information about workplace spread from unions, despite a 
statutory requirement that they disclose such information upon request.143 
Notably, many healthcare workers stated that they were willing to 
continue working with COVID-19 patients.144  Thousands came out of 
retirement during the pandemic,145 those in non-essential fields have 
switched to working in ICUs,146 and nursing students volunteered at clinics 
and vaccination sites.147  Although healthcare workers were crucial in 
protecting the public from COVID-19, many felt that management did not 
adequately protect their safety; by November of 2020, 1,400 healthcare 
workers had died of COVID-19.148 
ii. Systematic Failure to Protect Healthcare Workers 
As the first wave of COVID-19 hit the northeast, not only did employers 
often fail their employees, but government actors neglected to enforce 
sufficient safety standards.  Regulatory guidelines did not adequately ensure 
safe working conditions.  OSHA did not conduct on-site investigations 
during the pandemic and, according to some essential workers, was generally 
ineffective in its attempts to protect workers.149  For several months, it only 
 
 142. See Letter from Kris Hoffman, Area Dir., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. 
Dep’t of Lab. to IJKG Opco LLC (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.hpae.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/OSHA-CarePoint-Bayonne-FATALITY-CITATIONS-2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/69D7-JMLE]. 
 143. See id. The NLRA requires that employers provide reasonable information to unions 
upon request. In some types of workplaces, such as healthcare facilities, this duty may trump 
employees’ right to privacy regarding their health. See Robert M. Vercruysse & Susan K. 
Friedlaender, Employee Privacy Rights in the Public and Private Employment Sector, 68 
MICH. BAR J. 608, 610 (1989). 
 144. See Julia Simons & Jenny Vaughan, Sacrifice and Risk in the Time of COVID-19, 7 
FUTURE HEALTHCARE J. 158, 158 (2020). 
 145. See id. 
 146. See She Came to New York to Help Fight COVID. She Walked into a “War Movie,” 
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/she-came-to-
new-york-to-help-fight-covid-she-walked-into-a-war-movie [https://perma.cc/4PH4-2FCT]. 
 147. See Kilee Thomas, MWSU Nursing Students Work the Frontlines of the COVID-19 
Pandemic, KQ2 (May 6, 2021, 5:58 PM), https://www.kq2.com/content/news/MWSU-
nursing-students-turn-the-COVID-19-pandemic-into-the—574349241.html 
[https://perma.cc/UJZ7-X5BX]. 
 148. See Danielle Renwick, ‘Many of Us Have PTSD’: Pennsylvania Nurses Strike amid 
Covid Fears, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2020, 5:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/nov/21/us-nurses-strike-coronavirus-fears-pennsylvania [https://perma.cc/U56C-
X6GK]. 
 149. See Editorial, ‘You’re on Your Own,’ Essential Workers Are Being Told, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/opinion/osha-coronavirus.html 
[https://perma.cc/AC5Q-9MT5]. 
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responded to complaints by issuing letters to employers that violated safety 
requirements.150  Many OSHA complaints did not lead to citations until 
several months after the violations occurred.151  The agency’s response did 
not act as an effective deterrent when at-risk employees most needed 
government intervention. 
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), an influential federation of unions,152 petitioned 
OSHA to issue an Emergency Temporary Standard for Infectious 
Diseases.153  When the agency refused, AFL-CIO requested that the D.C. 
Circuit compel OSHA to issue an emergency standard.154  This was also 
unsuccessful, although, as the AFL-CIO pointed out, COVID-19 has caused 
more deaths in less time than any other event since OSHA was founded.155  
Instead of a temporary standard, the Secretary of Labor chose to issue non-
binding, optional guidance.156  As healthcare workers on the east coast were 
at their most vulnerable, the agency failed to act. 
In 2020, healthcare workers faced an unprecedented threat to their safety.  
The legal frameworks currently in place were not designed for a public health 
crisis of this scale, and they largely failed to protect workers.  Even unionized 
workers frequently lacked adequate access to PPE.157  Workers generally 
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have minimal protections from retaliation when they refuse to work in unsafe 
conditions.158  Healthcare workers’ right to engage in concerted activity is 
further limited by Section 8(g), which requires ten days’ notice.159  If 
workers are in imminent danger, this delay can be significant.160  While there 
is a logic behind Section 8(g), and healthcare workers should have some 
limits on their freedom to stop work, they also deserve the means to protect 
themselves. 
II. EXPLORING POTENTIAL REFORMS TO ENFORCE HEALTHCARE 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS 
This Part lays out a spectrum of potential policy proposals regarding 
healthcare workers’ rights.  As described above, there are multiple statutes 
and regulations that affect both workers’ safety and healthcare workers’ 
labor rights.  There are, therefore, many avenues for legal reform, through 
legislation and regulation, and benefitting workers either collectively or 
individually.  This Part also explores different perspectives as to how much 
freedom healthcare employees should have to stop work.  This Part compares 
the advantages of maintaining the status quo, imposing further restrictions 
on healthcare workers, or seeking reform through OSHA, Section 502, and 
Section 7. 
A. Maintaining the Status Quo 
One should not take for granted that existing legal frameworks on 
hazardous work need reform.  After all, Congress did not arbitrarily add 
notice requirements to the NLRA.161  It had valid concerns that patients 
would suffer if medical staff could organize a strike with no warning.162  
Workers at healthcare institutions provide a necessary service.  Even more 
so during a pandemic, their work is indispensable.  It is unfortunate that so 
many are at risk from COVID-19, but there is nonetheless a compelling 
public interest in keeping medical staff at work during such times. 
Further, healthcare workers, and even support staff also subject to 8(g), 




 158. See supra Sections I.A–C. 
 159. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g). 
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Physician’s Ethical and Legal Duty to Treat During a Pandemic, 20 MED. L. INT’L 211, 225 
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or other work stoppages could disrupt patient care). 
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home will always carry some risk, even support staff will likely have contact 
with contagious patients.  If a worker decides that she does not want to bear 
that risk, she is free to find other work.  This is not an ideal choice, but one 
may argue that it does not necessitate changing the law. 
One could also argue that hospital conditions during a pandemic are an 
anomaly.  The United States has not faced a public health crisis on this scale 
since the 1918 Spanish flu entered the country nearly a century ago,163 and 
it could very well be another century before we face such a widespread 
disease again.  Healthcare facilities may not encounter a similar situation in 
the near future, in which they face a virus as contagious as COVID-19 that 
will effect as many people.  Some of the issues they faced, such as PPE 
shortages, were not directly related to labor law and could be fixed 
logistically. 
However, while there are arguments in favor of maintaining the current 
system, the pandemic has exposed major flaws in American labor law that 
must be addressed.  Many essential workers are still in danger.  As of the 
writing of this Note, COVID-19 has not been completely contained in the 
United States and attempts to vaccinate the population have only been 
successful regionally.164  Healthcare workers across the country are still 
struggling to provide care to patients in overwhelmed hospitals.  The legal 
protections in place now are not sufficient to help workers who are still 
risking their lives. 
Even if an event on the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic is not guaranteed 
to be repeated in the near future, the pandemic has shown that there are gaps 
in our legislative and regulatory frameworks for essential healthcare 
employees.  As it stands now, employees at healthcare facilities have little 
recourse if they are asked to perform life-threatening work.  Despite the risks 
they have taken for public health, they have fewer protections than other 
workers when they engage in concerted activity.  Without reforms, we may 
see these problems repeat themselves if we face another pandemic. 
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These changes are especially necessary because many employers have 
shown that, absent a legal obligation, they will not protect their workers’ 
safety.165  Hospitals and nursing homes did struggle with circumstances 
beyond their control.166  However, they also made decisions that put their 
employees and staff at risk, such as distributing PPE inequitably or 
pressuring workers to return from quarantine early.167  Labor law, as it 
currently stands, largely leaves workers at their employers’ mercy. 
B. Further Restrictions on Healthcare Workers’ Rights 
Another possible reaction to COVID-19 is to reduce healthcare workers’ 
right to stop work. Before determining the best means of expanding 
healthcare workers’ right to refuse hazardous work, it is worth considering 
whether it is even ethical for them to do so.  They are more necessary than 
ever during a pandemic, and there is arguably a public interest in their ability 
to refuse work.168  Several states have enacted laws that prevent healthcare 
professionals from refusing to treat patients, and some specifically restrict 
healthcare workers from doing so during public health crises.169 
The basic policy rationale behind denying healthcare workers to stop work 
is obvious: if healthcare workers strike or otherwise stop work, then they are 
not caring for patients.  From a certain point of view, this could outweigh 
concerns over healthcare workers’ labor rights.  The NLRA, as passed in 
1947, excluded government and nonprofit hospitals.170  When Congress 
finally added nonprofit hospitals to the NLRA in 1974, it added the ten days’ 
notice requirement specifically to address concerns about patient welfare.171 
These concerns are not groundless; a study of nurses’ strikes in New York 
State between 1984 and 2004 found that prolonged strikes had a negative 
effect on in patient care.172  These concerns are heightened during a public 
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health crisis; there is a strong public interest in keeping hospitals fully staffed 
when unprecedented numbers of people are dying of illness.173  As one 
scholar noted, COVID-19 presented such a large threat to public health that 
“conceptual issues [came to] have real consequences.”174 
Some state governments have in fact, restricted healthcare workers’ right 
to refuse to treat patients.175  New York State, for example, subjects 
physicians to professional discipline for “abandoning or neglecting a 
patient . . . in need of immediate professional care, without making 
reasonable arrangements for the continuation of such care.”176  Other states 
have adopted provisions that specifically apply to healthcare workers during 
a pandemic or other public health crisis.177 
This basic idea is not limited to state law.  Under the LMRA, the Attorney 
General may petition a federal court to issue a “national emergency” 
injunction to end a strike which: “(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial 
part thereof . . . and (ii) if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the 
national health or safety . . . .”178  Under existing U.S. law, national well-
being may be a higher priority than labor rights. 
It is unclear to what degree unionized healthcare workers are protected by 
Section 502, which states that refusing work for safety reasons is not a 
strike.179  It is also unclear to what extent such limitations on healthcare 
workers’ rights would be preempted by Section 502.180  However, this would 
have a large impact on the rights of workers who lack union protection.  Non-
unionized healthcare employees currently have a fair amount of flexibility 
around Section 8(g)’s notice requirements, and courts have allowed them to 
engage in work stoppages.181  Suspending their protections under Section 
 
44 (2006) (stating that there is not a definitive link between labor action to a drop in patient 
welfare), with Sylvester C. Chima, Global Medicine: Is It Ethical or Morally Justifiable for 
Doctors and Other Healthcare Workers to Go On Strike?, 14 BMC MED. ETHICS, Dec. 2013, 
at 7, https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6939-14-S1-S5#citeas 
[https://perma.cc/9BC2-DB9G] (stating that harm to patients during a healthcare strike is 
greatly reduced if emergency services are still available). 
 173. See Konrad Szocik, Conceptual Issues in COVID-19 Pandemic: An Example of 
Global Catastrophic Risk, 29 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 199, 199 (2021) 
(illustrating the great impact of COVID-19 virus). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Coleman, supra note 168, at 3. 
 176. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.2(a)(1) (2011). 
 177. Maryland, Delaware, and South Carolina have passed mandatory-work provisions 
that apply to medical professionals. These were based on the Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act, a draft law written at the request of the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention 
in 2001, in anticipation of a bioterrorist attack. See Coleman, supra note 168, at 24. 
 178. 29 U.S.C. § 178. 
 179. See Coleman, supra note 168, at 15. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Kapiolani Hosp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1978). 
2021] ESSENTIAL OR DISPOSABLE?  1387 
502 would likely limit their protections from employer retaliation should 
they refuse to work when they feel unsafe. 
Curtailing the right to engage in concerted activity under Section 7 would 
have a much broader impact.  As with Section 502, non-unionized workers 
have much more flexibility to exercise these rights without giving notice 
under Section 8(g).  However, unionized workers at healthcare facilities still 
have some freedom to engage in protected concerted activity.  They may, for 
example, hold press conferences or engage in other activities that do not 
impact patient care.182  Under this proposal, they would no longer be able to 
engage in even these activities. 
However, there are serious flaws to this approach.  Healthcare facilities 
have not consistently acted in the best interests of their employees.183  During 
the first wave of the pandemic, there were not large-scale problems with 
essential workers abandoning their patients.  Rather, workers risked their 
lives as management failed to adequately protect their safety.184  This policy 
would address an issue that does not actually exist while limiting the rights 
of workers to fix very real problems. 
Additionally, restricting workers’ right to protect themselves and engage 
in concerted activity would undermine decades of labor activism and the 
intent of the NLRA.  It would also disproportionately affect unrepresented 
workers, who are already more vulnerable than their unionized colleagues 
and less likely to cause large-scale disruptions to patient care. 
C. Rely on Administrative Action 
Much of the law on safety-related work stoppages involves concerted 
activity on the part of employees.  However, administrative agencies may 
take affirmative action to enforce safety standards.  Instead of relying on 
union activity or worker action, OSHA could issue a temporary standard 
during public health crises.185  This standard could expand on regulation 
1977.12(b)(2), discussed above, to loosen the fairly stringent standard during 
emergency situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic.186  This is similar to 
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what the AFL-CIO attempted to do when it pushed for an emergency OSHA 
standard in 2020.187 
Currently, the standard requires that an employee have an objectively 
reasonable “apprehension of death or injury” and that, “where possible, [she] 
must also have sought . . . a correction of the dangerous condition” from her 
employer before refusing to perform work.188  This could be more flexible 
if, for example, the standard focused on a subjective fear.  As shown by 
litigation concerning Section 502, it can sometimes be difficult for 
employees to realize on short notice if their fear has an objective basis and 
then later to prove so in court.189 
The regulation could also be temporarily amended to lower the standard 
for receiving accommodations from employers.  While the text of the 
regulation does state that an employee is only required to seek corrections 
from management “where possible,”190 the regulation is designed to be the 
last resort for employees facing imminent danger.191  The number of workers 
facing such danger is obviously much higher during a global pandemic than 
otherwise.192  Additionally, in practice, employers may not have the 
opportunity to perform a cost-benefit analysis before refusing to, for 
example, treat a contagious patient without PPE.193 
There is a logic behind choosing to pursue reform through OSHA.  The 
agency was created to protect the public from danger in their workplaces and 
such a regulation would fall under its mandate.  In Whirlpool, the Supreme 
Court held that the OSH Act allows it to pass such a regulation.194  The 
agency also has some power to pass emergency standards.195  As OSHA had 
some difficulty monitoring workplaces during the pandemic,196 issuing a 
broader standard for employee self-help would allow it to protect workers 
without endangering its own inspectors. 
While there are valid policy reasons to support this proposal, it is not an 
ideal solution.  Even if OSHA were to amend its regulations, it may not be 
helpful in practice. As shown by OSHA’s inaction during the first wave of 
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the virus, the agency is not always efficient or reliable.197  It refused to issue 
an emergency temporary standard, despite months of lobbying and legal 
action from the AFL-CIO.198  OSHA also refused to perform site visits 
during the pandemic and did not act on complaints for several months.199  
Given its difficulty handling the COVID-19 crisis, relying on OSHA is likely 
not the best means of improving healthcare workers’ rights. 
D. Expand Section 502 
Worker’s rights could also be protected by expanding Section 502 of the 
LMRA.  Currently, this provision only provides that a worker does not 
engage in a strike when she refuses to work in “abnormally dangerous” 
conditions.200  This could be broadened to provide affirmative protections 
against retaliation.  Congress could amend Section 502 to guarantee 
reinstatement and backpay for any fired workers, or the NLRB could begin 
interpreting it more expansively.201 
This provision already allows unionized employees to stop work, even if 
their collective bargaining agreement contains a no-strike provision.  
Offering affirmative protections would make this provision a more appealing 
option for employees facing hazardous conditions.  It would also prevent 
outcomes like TNS in which the workers never recovered backpay awarded 
by the Board.202  Expanding its reach in this way would make Section 502 
much more useful to workers concerned with employer retaliation. 
After all, Section 502 is in some ways well-suited to the specific safety 
concerns raised by the pandemic.  It is somewhat narrowly focused on an 
employee’s right to refuse hazardous work and does not protect the right to 
protest or picket.203  This would minimize disruptions caused by public 
protest, but it would still allow employees to protect their safety, which was 
a major concern for many workers during the pandemic.204 
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However, despite the potential advantages of this reform, it is not a perfect 
solution.  There are problems with the substance of Section 502, which could 
be addressed through administrative clarity.  Yet even with such 
amendments, this provision may not be the best tool for protecting healthcare 
workers.  It is not clear how courts would reconcile Section 502 with Section 
8(g) notice requirements should a unionized employee refuse to work 
because she felt unsafe.205  Expanding the provision to include affirmative 
protections would therefore do little to help unionized healthcare workers 
and would predominantly benefit unrepresented employees who already 
have a broader range of activity exempt from notice requirements. 
There are also concerns with how courts have interpreted Section 502.  In 
Yellow Freight System, Inc., for example, the Board was more concerned 
with enforcing arbitration decisions than looking to the case’s underlying 
policy concerns.206  Even if the provision provides more protections than it 
does currently, workers must still convince arbitrators, the Board, and federal 
courts that their actions fall within the provision.207 
E. Waive Section 8(g) Notice Requirements 
Another approach is to remove limitations on workers in the medical 
industry. If Section 8(g) notice requirements are waived entirely in times of 
crisis, healthcare workers could advocate for themselves more effectively.  If 
unionized healthcare workers could engage in work stoppages without 
providing notice, they would have essentially the same rights as any other 
group of workers covered by the NLRA. 
Currently, healthcare workers must give their employers written notice 
ten days before any concerted activity that could disrupt patient care.208  
While this is generally applied more strictly to unionized workers than to 
those who lack representation, it severely curtails the ability of healthcare 
workers to organize.209  As discussed in the previous section, this is not a 
mere formality; employees who violate the notice provisions of Section 8(g) 
lose many statutory protections.210  This proposal would eliminate the notice 
requirement altogether during times of emergency.  As with earlier 
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recommendations, this could be triggered during a public health crisis, as 
defined by OSHA or the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
It should be noted that the United States is not alone in requiring that 
medical professionals give notice before a work stoppage.  Many other 
countries similarly require that hospitals be informed before a strike.211  
However, even in jurisdictions where there is not a statutory requirement to 
give notice, workers have often informed their employers before stopping 
work.  In some Canadian provinces, for example, healthcare workers have 
no notice requirements but have generally continued to care for the patients 
while on strike.212  This is partially due out of fear of bad publicity, as well 
as genuine concern for patients’ welfare.213  Whatever their reasons, medical 
professionals are unlikely to completely abandon those in their care.214  
Workers will not necessarily abuse their freedom if they do not have a notice 
requirement. 
Without provision 8(g), healthcare workers would have more flexibility 
to engage in concerted activity, which could be used (1) for their own 
protection or (2) to put pressure on their employers.  The first would occur 
as they could refuse to perform hazardous work without providing notice.  
This right to refuse work would give workers more leverage over 
management, as the ability to withhold labor is a powerful tool.  This would 
not only allow them to avoid unsafe conditions, but it could allow them to 
organize protests or pickets with short notice.  The extra ten days could be 
extremely helpful as they try to address workplace safety concerns, which 
have changed rapidly during the pandemic. 
However, this proposal could cause major disruptions to hospitals during 
an already chaotic time.  The logic behind Section 8(g) was that it could give 
healthcare facilities time to accommodate their patients before a strike.215  
While this provision has limited workers’ leverage when negotiating with 
management, it still serves a useful purpose.  Abandoning it entirely would 
potentially leave patients without care.  Although some Canadian medical 
staff have continued to treat patients while on strike,216 there is no guarantee 
that workers in the United States would do the same. 
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Additionally, no-strike clauses are fairly common in collective bargaining 
agreements.217  The statutory right to strike would therefore have little to no 
effect for many unions.  As a result, reform would disproportionately benefit 
unrepresented workers, who are already less beholden to Section 8(g) notice 
requirements.  Logistically, it would not benefit the workers who most need 
change. 
F. Allow Healthcare Workers to at Any Time Refuse to Perform 
Dangerous Work 
Another alternative is to allow healthcare workers to refuse to perform 
dangerous work at any time.  Under this proposal, any healthcare worker, 
regardless of her membership in a union, would be protected from retaliation 
if she subjectively feels unsafe and stops work.  Unlike the previous 
recommendation, which gave workers a conditional right to refuse work, this 
would provide workers with an unfettered ability to protect themselves from 
danger. 
Such an approach would allow workers at healthcare facilities to refuse to 
perform any task if they feel unsafe.  If, for example, a nurse refuses to treat 
a contagious patient, their employer could not discipline them.  Workers 
would have complete discretion to decide when they feel safe treating 
potentially dangerous patients.  This would likely encourage employers to 
provide safe working conditions and adequate PPE. 
This approach may seem appealing given the poor conditions that 
healthcare workers have faced.  After all, many hospitals and nursing homes 
failed to do the bare minimum to protect their employees.218  Thousands of 
healthcare workers have died as a result of this administrative neglect.219  
Giving healthcare workers flexibility to protect themselves is tempting, 
especially when their employers and the government have largely failed to 
do so. 
Despite its appeal, such a broad standard would be massively disruptive 
to patient care.  While it would give healthcare workers greater freedom, it 
would not address the policy concern that led to the inclusion of Section 8(g): 
that hospitals must be fully staffed.220  As Congress recognized in 1974, this 
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consequence could potentially be disastrous even in normal times.221  During 
a pandemic, when it is more important that healthcare facilities be fully 
staffed, it could potentially be catastrophic. 
This approach would also require a massive shift in labor law.  The 
proposal to waive Section 8(g), discussed above, would have given 
healthcare workers substantially the same rights as any other worker under 
the NLRA.  This proposal would go even further and give employees at 
healthcare facilities more protections than any other workers covered by the 
Act.  Although healthcare workers deserve more legal protections than they 
currently have, there are valid policy arguments in favor of some restrictions. 
G. Expand Section 7 Protections 
Finally, a conditional right could be created for unionized healthcare 
employees to stop work based on Section 7 of the NLRA.  In NLRB v. City 
Disposal Systems, Inc., a single employee’s protest was a protected activity 
because it enforced a provision in his collective bargaining agreement.222  
Under current law, healthcare workers likely would not be able to engage in 
the same type of activity without violating Section 8(g). 
However, a right could be created to exempt workers from Section 8(g) 
notice requirements if they face dangerous conditions that their employer 
could reasonably mitigate and if they are acting to enforce a provision of 
their collective bargaining agreement.  If these conditions are met, then 
unionized employees who stop work without giving notice could be entitled 
to reinstatement and backpay.  This could allow healthcare workers a limited 
right to engage in protected concerted activity to protect their safety.  This 
right can be effectuated by refusing to perform a specific task, rather than, 
for example, collectively refusing to report to work.  This mirrors the fact 
patterns in many seminal cases involving workplace safety, including 
Whirlpool,223 City Disposal,224 and Washington Aluminum,225 where 
workers were faced with dangerous conditions and decided on short notice 
to stop work. 
This would effectively allow healthcare workers to protect their safety and 
put pressure on management while also minimizing disruptions to patient 
care.  A large-scale nurses’ strike with no notice in the middle of the 
pandemic is exactly the type of scenario Section 8(g) was designed to 
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prevent.  By comparison, it is much more reasonable for a nurse to refuse to 
treat a single contagious patient without adequate PPE. 
III. ALLOWING HEALTHCARE WORKERS TO PROTECT THEIR SAFETY 
THROUGH CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
The most effective way to enforce workers’ rights without sacrificing 
patient welfare is to expand Section 7.  The main goal of such a reform would 
be to pressure employers to provide adequate protections.  A conditional 
right to refuse work tied to a provision meant to protect collective action is 
ideal. 
This Part discusses the reform itself and its underlying policy goals.  It 
addresses the advantages of tying this to employee action rather than an 
administrative agency, as well as the advantages of linking it to collective 
action by organized workers.  This Part also touches on the policy basis and 
mechanisms for linking the right to employer responsibility, as well as the 
advantages of relying on Section 7 over other statutory provisions. 
A. Reconciling Section 7 with the Healthcare Industry 
Under the legal framework currently in place, organized employees at 
healthcare facilities currently have fewer means of protecting their safety 
than most other workers in different fields.226  While many workers may not 
have felt unsafe before 2020, the recent pandemic has shown that healthcare 
workers can very quickly become very vulnerable as many found themselves 
risking their lives to treat patients.227  These safety concerns can best be 
addressed through a carve out that gives them rights similar to those of 
workers in other fields. 
Case law has established that an individual employee may engage in 
protected concerted activity, provided that she acts to protect a provision in 
her collective bargaining agreement.228  While many other means of refusing 
to perform dangerous work have not yet been definitively reconciled with 
Section 8(g) notice provisions, as discussed above, relying on Section 7 
specifically could give workers a narrow but useful means of protecting their 
safety.  Such a right would allow unionized healthcare workers to engage in 
protected concerted activity, even if they act individually. 
Workers could avail themselves of this right if unions negotiated for 
provisions in their collective bargaining agreements stipulating that 
employers must provide reasonably safe working conditions.  Given their 
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experiences during the pandemic, unions representing workers in the 
healthcare industry are likely to do so when they next renegotiate their 
agreements.  Such a provision could serve as the foundation of a right to 
participate in protected concerted activity without giving notice under 
Section 8(g).  Under this proposal, if managers fail to protect workers’ safety, 
as defined either in the collective bargaining agreement or in comparison to 
industry standards, then workers would be able to refuse to perform work 
without risking retaliation from their employers.  It would essentially exempt 
provisions which relate to employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace from 
Section 8(g). 
As this right would be based on collective bargaining agreements, the 
exact provision would be negotiated between unions and employers, which 
would allow both parties to reach a consensus on how to define employer 
responsibility and which actions do not require ten days’ notice under the 
Act.  This would likely be based on industry standards for safety and would 
limit the provision only to situations similar to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
which was unprecedented in both its scale and contagiousness.  Enforcement 
would likely be subject to any relevant mechanisms detailed in the contract, 
such as arbitration.  It should ideally be protected by the Board and federal 
courts of appeals, which are responsible for enforcing labor law. 
This proposal would create a relatively narrow right that would 
nonetheless give workers more flexibility to negotiate with their employers 
and to protect their safety under dangerous circumstances.  It would also fit 
neatly within existing frameworks for protecting worker safety.229  This 
could make the healthcare industry significantly safer without dramatically 
overhauling existing labor law or unnecessarily risking patient safety. 
B. The Importance of Allowing Healthcare Workers to Refuse 
Hazardous Work 
As illustrated by the state of working conditions during the pandemic, 
providing healthcare workers a right to refuse hazardous work is imperative.  
While there is a valid public interest in ensuring that sick patients receive 
care, healthcare workers have recently been forced to choose between risking 
their lives and keeping their jobs.  While they may have agreed to adopt some 
risk by entering the healthcare field, they have faced unprecedented danger 
since COVID-19 entered the United States as a result of employer neglect.230  
Many hospitals did not take reasonable measures to protect their employees’ 
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safety.231  Under current legal frameworks, workers have relatively little 
recourse when hospital management fails them. 
The lack of recourse exists partially because healthcare workers’ welfare 
has been seen as coming at the expense of patients.  When looking at Section 
8(g) in the past, the Board and courts have weighed workers’ rights against 
patient welfare.232  However, when fighting a contagious disease, these 
concepts are not opposed but rather closely linked.  Workers at healthcare 
institutions became potential carriers of the virus.233  This includes medical 
staff not only in hospitals but also nursing homes and prisons.234  When these 
workers were not given adequate PPE during the first wave, they often 
spread it from patient to patient, further endangering already at-risk 
populations.235  The American Medical Association noted that healthcare 
providers may have a duty to individual patients, but they “also have a long-
recognized public health responsibility,” which requires them to “protect 
their own health to ensure that they remain able to provide care.”236  There 
are public interest concerns beyond just workers’ rights. 
Additionally, it is not necessarily true that striking healthcare workers 
would abandon patients.  Studies in the United States, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom report that most doctors feel they should not be penalized 
for failing to treat contagious patients but also claim they would risk their 
own safety to do so.237  In practice, many striking healthcare workers have 
continued to treat emergency cases.238  Notably, during a nurses’ strike in 
Hong Kong held to protest the government’s lukewarm attempts to contain 
the pandemic, many nurses continued to treat COVID-19 patients.239  
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Expanding healthcare workers’ right to stop work would not necessarily 
leave patients without care. 
To the extent that there are competing interests in patient’s welfare and 
healthcare workers’ safety, they can best be balanced through a conditional 
right to stop work.  As discussed above, Section 8(g) was not arbitrarily 
added to the NLRA.240  It has an important function in ensuring that patients 
receive care.  However, expanding workers’ existing rights to refuse 
dangerous work to healthcare workers gives them a necessary tool to protect 
themselves and to pressure their employers to ensure safe working 
conditions.  Making the right to refuse dangerous work conditional would 
minimize the risk of disruptions to patient care during a public health crisis. 
C. Rationale for Employer Responsibility 
While a conditional, rather than universal, right is certainly helpful, it is 
also important to consider what makes it conditional. A conditional right 
solution would be most effective if it was conditioned on employer fault.  
Such a requirement would incentivize employers to proactively ensure 
safety, which is especially useful as management is best positioned to protect 
safety.  During the pandemic’s first peak in New York City, medical staff 
struggled not only with a lack of PPE but also with hospitals’ lack of 
effective PPE management and distribution.241 
As discussed above, this mechanism could be negotiated in the contract 
between unions and their employers.  Therefore, it would be subject to the 
contract’s provisions around dispute resolution and enforcement from the 
Board should those measures fail.  If an employee refuses to perform work 
and the employer failed to take reasonable precautions to protect the 
employee’s safety, as defined in the collective bargaining agreement, then 
the employee should not be fired or subject to discipline. 
Under this proposal, the right to refuse unsafe work would be triggered 
when employers fail to take “reasonable precautions” to protect employees’ 
safety.  Thus, it is important to determine how “reasonable precaution” is 
defined.  The exact parameters could be negotiated into a collective 
bargaining agreement, although, should this issue be adjudicated, it may be 
held to a common industry standard.  For example, hospital staff should 
reasonably expect management to provide them with properly fit-tested N-
95 respirators when they interact with a COVID-19 positive patient.242  
Should hospitals or nursing homes fail to take such measures, employees 
who refuse to work should be shielded from retaliation.  This could account 
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for the anomalous nature of the pandemic, as normal safety precautions 
would not trigger this right. 
A mechanism such as the one described above could have made a 
significant difference during the pandemic.  The media narrative during the 
pandemic was that PPE simply did not exist.  This was not entirely untrue; 
there was in fact a severe PPE shortage.243  However, there were still steps 
that managers could have taken to protect workers.  Hospital administrators 
could have logged which employees tested positive for COVID-19 and 
shared that information with unions.244  They could have allowed sick 
employees to remain quarantined for the recommended 14 days before 
returning to work.245  They could have distributed existing PPE more 
equitably and effectively.246  Hospitals and nursing homes would have been 
more likely to take these steps had there been consequences for not doing so.  
If workers could potentially stop work based on employer fault, hospitals 
may have been less likely to confiscate workers’ PPE, as they did in the early 
days of the pandemic. 
Incentivizing employers to proactively enforce high safety standards is 
especially important, as managers are better positioned than workers to do 
so.  When the government distributed PPE, the government often sent PPE 
directly to hospital management.247  There was very little transparency in this 
process, and some unions had concerns that healthcare institutions were 
stockpiling PPE without giving it out to front-line workers.248  Giving unions 
the means to pressure employers would make such mismanagement less 
likely to happen.  It would help to ensure that hospitals and nursing homes 
are safer for both workers and patients. 
D. The Advantages of Worker over Agency Action 
The carve out described above would rely on worker-led unions rather 
than top-down reforms from administrative agencies.  While OSHA 
regulations already have a standard for employer fault, there are also 
advantages to relying on unions rather than government organizations.  
Agencies such as OSHA do not always have the resources to effectively 
enforce their standards even under normal circumstances.  They struggled to 
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perform even basic tasks during the pandemic.249  Unions are better 
positioned to respond to work emergencies efficiently and to represent 
workers’ needs. 
OSHA has an important role in protecting workplace safety, but it has 
long struggled with underfunding and lack of manpower.250  During the 
spring and summer of 2020, OSHA stopped sending inspectors to visit 
workplaces in person and often responded to complaints with letters.251  
Complaints in tri-state area hospitals only led to citations months after the 
virus had subsided.252  Attempts to lobby OSHA for a temporary emergency 
standard failed.253  The agency was not toothless; after all, citations did 
eventually come through.254  Yet, it is still less reliable than unions. 
Unlike an administrative agency distant from workers’ daily concerns, 
unions are operated by people on the ground.  This bottom-up structure 
allows workers to advocate for their own needs rather than wait for an agency 
to act.  Unions are generally more responsive to immediate needs than OSHA 
and can act more swiftly.255  Such procedural flexibility is invaluable in 
situations such as the recent pandemic when the situation changed each day, 
and many workers very quickly found themselves in danger.256 
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In addition to the practical advantages of relying on a union rather than 
OSHA, doing so would be more effective doctrinally.  A right based on 
Section 7 would be more flexible than the relevant OSHA regulation.  
Regulation 1977.12(b)(2) sets a very high standard for employees to stop 
unsafe work and strongly encourages workers to use a complaint mechanism 
that does not reliably work.257  While it has its benefits, this course of action 
is designed to be a last resort.  A collective bargaining right, by contrast, 
would give workers a voice in determining the contours of their right to 
refuse certain work, and it would give them the full and immediate backing 
of their unions should they choose to exercise this right.  In practice, it would 
likely be more effective than Regulation 1977.12(b)(2). 
E. Advantages of a Collective over an Individual Right 
There are also advantages to linking this right to unions rather than 
applying it individually to all workers.  Under current frameworks, Section 
8(g) places more limits on employers who belong to unions than those who 
do not.  While unionized nurses could not refuse voluntary overtime without 
giving notice,258 courts rarely require Section 8(g) notice of their non-
unionized counterparts.259  Workers have a great deal of flexibility to protest 
even coordinated action so long as they stop short of unionizing.260 
There is a logic to this framework.  Unionized workers are the most 
threatening to management and the most likely to cause a large-scale 
disruption to patient care.261  However, during the first wave of the 
pandemic, this ironically left them with fewer options to protect themselves.  
Conditionally waiving Section 8(g) could give unions a useful tool when 
they need to protect both their members and their patients. 
It is worth considering that this may be most useful as a means of 
pressuring employers for better safety precautions rather than a tool to 
facilitate large-scale strikes.  Many workers in the healthcare industry chose 
to enter that field because they are willing to risk their own safety to help 
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their patients.262  Even if workers do not use this right to protect themselves, 
it would give them more leverage against hospital management.  If this right 
is most useful as a bargaining tool, then unions would be better equipped to 
use it than unrepresented workers. 
Logistically, it also makes sense for this right to be tied to collective 
bargaining agreements.  Teamsters’ unions have included provisions relating 
to safety for years, which gave rise to cases like City Disposal.263  After their 
experiences with COVID-19, unions in the healthcare field may likely begin 
to do the same when they negotiate new agreements.  Doing so would put 
employers on notice that they must address workplace safety.  This would 
ensure that hospital employees have better working conditions, which is the 
true goal of this reform, and it would minimize unexpected disruptions 
should unions organize a work stoppage. 
F. Advantages of Section 7 over Section 502 
The proposed conditional right to refuse dangerous work is most effective 
if tied to Section 7 instead of another statutory provision protecting safety.  
While Section 7 of the NLRB and Section 502 of the LMRA can both be 
used to protect worker safety, there are also advantages to relying on the 
former rather than the latter.  In addition to working with unions, there are 
doctrinal concerns with Section 502 that make it comparatively ineffective. 
Most significantly, Section 502 does not provide affirmative rights 
beyond stating that withholding work under certain conditions is not a 
strike.264  While this could theoretically be reformed to better protect 
healthcare workers, it provides relatively few protections to any workers.265  
It does minimize the risk of engaging in an unprotected strike, but employees 
who rely on their work for survival may not feel entirely comfortable relying 
on Section 502 in times of crisis. 
Even accounting for that, as discussed in Part II, this standard has not 
consistently protected workers.  In Yellow Freight, for example, a safety 
dispute was subject to arbitration.266  The Board upheld the arbitrator’s 
decision, although it undermined the policy rationale behind Section 502.267  
Similarly, the workers in TNS achieved only a Pyrrhic victory.268  There, 
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workers spent nearly two decades in litigation and, despite prevailing in 
court, they ultimately did not receive back pay.269 
Additionally, a mechanism based on Section 7 is more likely to withstand 
administrative shifts.  Section 502 also relies on an objective standard, which 
could be whittled down by an anti-labor Board.  The NLRB is somewhat 
notorious for being politicized270 and, despite being supposedly objective, 
the “abnormally dangerous” criteria is often determined subjectively by 
board members.271  This makes Section 502 a relatively flimsy shield for 
workers facing danger. 
G. Advantages of Expanding Section 7 Protections 
For all the reasons described above, healthcare workers deserve more 
protection than the law currently affords them.  This could be accomplished 
through a mechanism tied to collective bargaining agreements.  Provisions 
requiring that employers provide reasonably safe working conditions should 
be exempted from the requirement that healthcare workers provide ten days’ 
notice before concerted activity.  This could allow unions and managers to 
carve out a narrow but helpful exception to Section 8(g), which would give 
workers substantially more flexibility when advocating for safer conditions. 
Giving employees at healthcare facilities the right to engage in concerted 
activities during emergencies balances concerns for worker and patient 
welfare.  It would allow unions to pressure employers to provide reasonable 
safety accommodations in times of emergency without giving workers carte 
blanche to stop work in the middle of a pandemic.  Employees could 
advocate for their safety without undermining their responsibility to care for 
patients. 
CONCLUSION 
In April of 2020, one worker asked: “Are we essential or disposable?”272  
Many workers deemed “essential” have asked the same question since 
COVID-19 entered the United States.  Even as cities organized nightly rituals 
to celebrate healthcare workers or dedicated murals to them, many remained 
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overworked, underpaid, and inadequately protected.273  Although 
vaccination rates are high and communities have returned to pre-pandemic 
life in many regions of the United States, many hospitals are no better 
prepared for a new pandemic than they were in February 2020.274 
These shortages are due in part to administrative error and the logistical 
difficulties of supplying equipment on short notice.275  However, hospitals’ 
failure to protect their staff comes from a culture of not valuing workers and 
a legal system that has not updated its national labor laws since 1974.  
COVID-19 has exposed flaws that have been present but unaddressed for 
decades.  Giving healthcare workers an explicit right to refuse hazardous 
work would ensure their well-being in the long term, even after the 
pandemic-era gratitude fades. 
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